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This paper reviews the literature on the informal economy, focusing ¯rst on em-
pirical ¯ndings and then on existing approaches to modelling informality within both
partial and general equilibrium environments. We concentrate on labour and credit
markets, since these tend to be most a®ected by informality. The phenomenon is
particularly important in emerging and other developing economies, given their high
degrees of informal labour and ¯nancial services and the implications these have for the
e®ectiveness of macroeconomic policy. We emphasize the need for dynamic general
equilibrium (DGE) and ultimately dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models for a full understanding of the costs, bene¯ts and policy implications of infor-
mality. The survey shows that the literature on informality is quite patchy, and that
there are several unexplored areas left for research.
JEL Classi¯cation: J65, E24, E26, E32
Keywords: Informal economy, labour market, search-matching models
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7 Conclusions 331 Introduction
Informality, usually regarded as an economic activity that is neither taxed nor monitored
by the government, is common in emerging markets and developing countries where bur-
densome regulations and taxes coexist with poor public services and government's weak
enforcement capabilities. From this perspective, informality is often the result of ine±-
cient public policies and the presence of an informal sector ultimately re°ects the failure
of political institutions to protect and promote an e±cient and equitable market economy.
That said, there is disagreement over the de¯nition of informality; whilst we refer to it
in a general way above, in fact it is a changing term with a focus on either the ¯rm as in
ILO (1972) or the worker as in ILO (2002).1 Furthermore, in some countries, i.e. India,
the informal sector is identi¯ed with the unorganized sector whilst in advanced economies
the term usually refers to the `hidden' economy implying some kind of tax evasion. Finally,
it is also evident that informality is a general term and it needs to be de¯ned with respect
to both product and factor markets.2
Is informality actually good or bad? The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, in-
formality is often viewed as bad for a number of reasons: It leads to inferior working
conditions, social vulnerabilities, low productivity, unfair competition, disrespect for the
rule of law, erosion of the legitimacy and integrity of public institutions, corruption, and
last but not least, low ¯scal revenues. The latter in turn prevent improving public ser-
vices and strengthening institutions in charge of tax and regulation enforcement, making
it harder to get rid of informality in the ¯rst place. Importantly, as reviewed in section
6.2, informality has been found to be negatively correlated with economic growth by com-
pressing productivity and restricting access of informal ¯rms and workers to necessary
public services. The costs of informality appear even larger considering that the inability
of enforcing environmental, workers' welfare and consumers' protection eventually hinders
the integration of many developing countries into the global market in various ways.
On the other hand we report evidence revealing that informal credit markets are as-
sociated with positive growth rates (see section 6.2). In a world with imperfections in
1See Chen (2007) for a description of the move from the `old' to the `new' view of informality (Table 2
in this survey) as well as section 2.1 and Table 1 of this survey for the problems encountered in measuring
informality given the lack of a uni¯ed de¯nition.
2See Table 5.
1the product, credit and/or labour markets informality can increase e±ciency and so can
have a positive impact on the formal economy. This needs to be considered to arrive at a
¯nal conclusion on the overall impact of informality. For this reason, instead of focusing
only on one aspect, a literature has emerged that assesses both the costs and bene¯ts of
informality as explained in Batini et al. (2009) reviewed in section 6.3.
Recent accurate data on the size of the informal sector are available for a number
of emerging market and developing economies as reported in section 2.2 of this survey.
In some of these countries, for example in Bolivia, India, Nigeria, Panama, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Peru, informality has been estimated to characterize over three quarters of the
labour force and little less than a half of total sales-implying a shadow economy as large
as 60 to 70 percent of GDP. (See Perry et al. (2007) for more details).
Recognition of the impact of informal behavior on economic activity has given impetus
to a growing literature on informality over the past few years. This literature includes
work that attempts to quantify the extent of informality in various countries and work
seeking to explain the causes and the nature of the informal sector, either by establishing
regularities in the data or by devising economic models for policy analysis that stylize
informal behavior.
Given that a large informal economy is generally thought to be detrimental for the
o±cial economy, not surprisingly, research e®ort has been directed to analyze possible
ways to reduce its size. Understanding what drives informal behavior and how the in-
formal sector evolves and reacts to various combinations of public policies { including
¯scal, ¯nancial, social protection, labour market and enforcement policies { is crucial for
the design of measures conducive to signi¯cant reductions in present informality levels.
Moreover, a knowledge of informal labour and credit markets is important to understand
the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the conduct of an e®ective monetary
policy.
This survey reviews this literature and can serve as a point of departure for future
research in those areas that remain uncharted or that require a deeper understanding.
Our survey goes beyond existing surveys on informality that limit their review to either
labour markets as in Fields (2005) and Perry et al. (2007), regional evidence as in Perry
et al. (2007) that focuses exclusively on Latin America, or one type of equilibrium (like
2Ghosh et al. (1999) that focuses uniquely on partial equilibrium models of informal credit
markets).3 By contrast we emphasize the need for dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) and
ultimately dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models for a full understanding
of the costs, bene¯ts and policy implications of informality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the empirical evidence
on informality. Section 3 describes early models of informal labour markets. Section
4 introduces the three margins of informality and the standard search-matching model.
First, it discusses the intersectoral margin for workers and the traditional concerns of
wage dualism. Second, it analyzes theoretical developments on the intersectoral margin
for ¯rms and ¯nally presents the most recent theoretical developments on the intra¯rm
margin and the occupational choice. Section 5 discusses informality in the credit sector.
Section 6 describes the move to a dynamic general equilibrium approach to informality.
Section 7 concludes with a summary of a number of open questions.
2 Literature on empirical evidence
The literature on the empirical evidence on informality takes at heart four main questions:
1) How do we measure the informal economy? 2) How large is the informal economy in
the world? 3) What are the main drivers of the informal behavior? And last but not least,
4) What impact does informality have on the formal economy? Below we summarize key
¯ndings in these areas. See Perry et al. (2007) for a detailed analysis on Latin American
and Caribbean countries, Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider (2005) for a more
global approach.
2.1 How do we measure the informal economy?
How do we measure the informal economy? There are two approaches in the literature
in attempting to respond this question. The ¯rst focuses on measures of hidden income,
while the second on the size of informal employment. The size of the informal economy
can di®er considerably depending on which measurement we use.
Examples of the ¯rst approach include Schneider (2005) and Chaudari et al. (2006),
who de¯ne informal all unregistered economic activities, which contributes to the o±cially
3See Table 1 for a description of the various aspects of informality.
3calculated GNP. This strand of literature focuses on all the portion of income from legal
activities not considered by the standard measurement procedures used for the compilation
of national income accounts. A broader view includes illegal activities and the informal
household economy, but a stricter de¯nition looks mainly at all legal activities that would
generally be taxable. Those activities are unreported mainly for tax evasion and to avoid
social security contributions and other labour market regulations.
The National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS from
now on) reports on De¯nitional and Statistical Issues relating to the Informal Economy
in India is an example of the second approach. According to this report, the informal (or
unorganized) economy is given by the informal (or unorganized) sector and its workers
plus the informal workers in the formal sector, where the unorganized (informal) sector is
de¯ned as all incorporated private enterprizes owned by individuals/households with less
than 10 workers. Also the report de¯nes unorganized (informal) workers, as workers in
the unorganized sector, households, excluding regular workers with social security bene¯ts,
plus workers in the formal sector without any social security bene¯t (NCEUS (2008)) 4.
From a methodological point of view, the size of the informal economy has been esti-
mated directly and indirectly. The direct method relies on surveys or samples, while the
latter uses macroeconomic indicators with information on informal activities. The main
drawbacks of direct methods as survey or tax-auditing are that the information collected
is often incomplete, samples can be biased, and also they refer to one point in time, lacking
information on the development of the phenomenon over a period of time.
There are a variety of indirect methods to quantify the extent of informality. Schneider
(2005) describes ¯ve of the most used methods. Schneider (2005), for example, opts for
the currency demand and the DYMIMIC (dynamic-multiple indicators multiple-causes)
methods. The former of these is based on the assumption that cash payments is used for
hidden transactions so an increase in the demand of currency should re°ect, separating all
other possible causes, an increase in the number of hidden transactions. The latter of these,
which is an evolution from the MIMIC or unobserved/latent variables approach is based on
the critique that the shadow economy has an impact not only on money market, but also
on production and labour markets. The size of the hidden economy (unobserved variable)
4See ILO (2002) for a comparison of informal employment in various economies.
4is in°uenced by a set of (measurable) indicators/causes such as the burden of taxes and
regulation as well as tax morality, and change in labour force participation. Based on
the statistical theory of unobserved variables, the unknown coe±cients are simultaneously
estimated in a set of structural equations typically by maximum likelyhood. The indicator
variables are used to capture the e®ect of the unobserved variables indirectly. Di®erent
combinations of causes and indicators can then be used to provide di®erent estimates as
clari¯ed in Chaudari et al. (2006). This method provides a time-series index for latent
variables, an ordinal index which is then converted into a cardinal series of values of size
by scaling up ordinal values to cardinal values previously obtained through other indirect
methods (i.e. currency-demand approach). One of the main criticism of this method
is the lack of a theoretical link of causes and indicators with informality being the only
unobserved variables linking them (Perry et al. (2007)). See Appendix A in Schneider
(2005) for a detailed analysis of the main methods used to estimate the shadow economy
and to Dell'Anno (2003) for a detailed analysis of the MIMIC approach and its main
criticisms.
In response to some of the criticisms of the MIMIC approach, Solomon (2008) uses
a RBC model as a theoretical framework for choosing causes and indicators used in the
estimation of the size of the informal economy.
2.2 The size of the informal economy
What is the size of the informal economy in the world? In general, data on the size,
composition and contribution of informality is limited and international comparison of the
scale of the phenomenon is di±cult due to di®erent measurement strategies.5 For this
reason, the main ¯ndings are often supported by indirect measurement methods.
In general, as we saw above, estimates of the size of the informal economy can be in
terms of income or in terms of employment.6 Chen (2007) reports that informal employ-
ment is about one-half to three-quarters of non-agricultural employment in developing
5Many countries exclude agriculture and others include only an urban informal sector.
6We also would like to stress that direct methods depends on the de¯nition of informality used. Henley
et al. (2006) point out that the choice of the de¯nition is often dictated by data availability. In their paper
they compare di®erent de¯nitions of informality based on employment contract legislation, social security
protection and employers/employees' characteristics using a complete household survey for Brazil.
5Figure 1: The Size of the Informal Economy around the World Schneider (2005)
countries. The estimate is likely to increase if we include the agricultural sector and
other Asian countries in addition to India. Schneider (2005), using a combination of the
DYMIMIC and currency-demand approach, reports results for 110 countries and reports
data . The estimates show that the informal sector has increased considerably in African
countries, but also in other developing economies. Upward trends are also found for tran-
sitional and developed economies.7
The increase in informality is partially con¯rmed in Perry et al. (2007) for a subset of
countries. The general trend of informality for Latin American and the Caribbean suggests
an increase over time even if di®erences exist between informal salaried and self-employed
(Figure 1.9 of the report). See Table 3. A similar trend is con¯rmed in ILO (2002) 8
Rei and Battacharya (2008) points out how data availability on informal employment is
usually available for a limited set of countries, compared to the wider estimates of the
informal economy provided in Schneider (2005). Also Box 1.3 in Perry et al. (2007) shows
that when o±cial statistics are available they may con°ict with uno±cial measurement of
informality as in Schneider (2005).
7See Table 3.
8See Henley et al. (2006) for a discussion on the range of empirical de¯nitions of informality employed
in the literature
62.3 Causes and impact of informality
What is the impact of informality on the formal economy? Loayza (1997) tests for Latin
American countries in the 1990s predictions from his theoretical model: Countries with
large tax burden and weak enforcement system should show a negative relationship be-
tween the size of the informal sector and economic growth.9 Results are con¯rmed with
countries with very restrictive labour market regulations and poor enforcement systems
showing the largest informal sector (i.e. Bolivia, Panama and Peru). In general, the re-
lationship between informality and growth can be viewed in two of the following ways.
Following Loayza (1997), the informal sector restrains growth because it reduces labour
market productivity and hinders the enjoyment of public goods on the side of both workers
and producers. An alternative hypothesis is that, in a world with various kind of imper-
fections (i.e. labour market regulation, corruption, etc.), the informal sector increases
e±ciency and so it has a positive impact on economic growth. Nikopour et al. (2008)
reviews several papers investigating empirically the relationship between informality and
growth for 21 OECD countries and concludes in favor of a positive impact of informality
on growth.
Rei and Battacharya (2008) use regression analysis on low and middle-income coun-
tries' data to establish possible drivers of informality. Using Schneider (2005) data they
¯nd no general evidence on the impact of higher taxation and labour market regulation,
but these results are not robust to the inclusion of indices of public and corporate gover-
nance. The main ¯nding then is that strong or stronger governance favors formality.
2.4 Main stylized facts
2.4.1 Informal employment
Looking at the empirical literature discussed above, the following stylized facts emerge:
² developing countries tend to have a higher degree of informality than OECD coun-
tries (stylized fact 1, hereafter SF 1)
9The key assumption is that production technology depends on congestible public services and the
informal sector has only a limited access to this services. See section 6.2 for a more detailed analysis of
the theoretical model.
7² many countries reveal an increasing trend of informality (SF 2)
Those stylized facts on the size and trends across time seem to be con¯rmed by a speci¯c
studies in India by the (NCEUS). The o±cial estimates, that identify the informal economy
with the unorganized sector plus informal jobs in the organized sector, point to a growing
trend of the already dominant unorganized sector in India. Also, another interesting
stylized fact emerges:
² the informalization of the formal sector (SF 3)
With this de¯nition, the Commission implies that there has been an increase in informal
job (i.e. without job/social security) within the formal/organized sector. A similar trend
is con¯rmed for Argentina and other Latin American countries in Perry et al. (2007) and
Bosch and Maloney (2006). Bosch's modelling strategy described in section 4.3 explains
these stylized facts (i.e the stipulation of informal contracts within a formal ¯rm) through
a stochastic job matching model.
An analysis of Mexican and Brazilian labour markets shows they have a relatively
low unemployment rate compared to OECD countries. Bosch and Maloney (2006, 2007),
looking at microeconometric evidence from gross worker °ows in Brazil and Mexico claim
that as a result of downturns and policy reforms, informal employment has changed con-
siderably due to the following stylized facts:
² the job ¯nding rate of formal jobs is highly procyclical (volatility puzzle), while the
job ¯nding rate of informal jobs is more stable (SF 4)
² the job separation rate in informal jobs is more responsive to negative shocks even
though the separation rates for formal and informal jobs are both countercyclical
(SF 5)
In general, Bosch and Maloney (2006, 2007) ¯nd that the hiring behavior of formal ¯rms
is the main driving force to a®ect the share of formal employment.
² During a recession, despite the large increase in the job separation rate for informal
jobs, the share of formal jobs decreases (SF 6)
Also, and related to this, the evidence from Mexico and Brazil shows that °ows from
the informal to the formal sector are highly pro-cyclical while °ows in the other direction
8are procyclical, but less volatile. As before, Bosch (2006, 2007) attempt to develop a
theoretical framework to capture those stylized facts. Even though informality is mainly
concentrated in the non-tradable sector, the author claims there is a need to model the
change of the formal employment share within industries and occupation. This is in
contrast with the idea that a change in the share of informality is due to sectorial changes
as discussed in the NCEUS report whose ¯ndings point to an increasing trend towards
more °exibility of employment, outsourcing and the growth of telecommunication and IT
services as a possible explanation of the increasing share of informal employment in India.
Maloney (1999, 2004) provide evidence against the segmentation assumption. Maloney
(1999) shows that despite a very large informal sector, labour markets are mobile and
wages are °exible. Maloney (2004) shows that in many Latin American countries the
informal sector is mostly voluntary. Finally, the evidence for Latin American countries
shows that the informal labour market is ultimately heterogeneous and composed by, both
self-employed and salaried workers.
Stylized facts on the cyclical behavior of informality are ambiguous. Normally, the
informal sector expands during downturns (see previous stylized facts), but there is also
evidence of pro-cyclical movements of the informal sector. Fiess et al. (2006) and Perry
et al. (2007) provide a theoretical explanation in terms of asymmetric shocks between
tradable and non-tradable sectors.
Empirical evidence on income and education between sectors point to the following
stylized facts. Mastalioglu and Rigolini (2006) show that
² there is a negative correlation between the informal sector employment and education
within countries as well as between informal employment and average education
attainment across countries (SF 7)
Albrecht et al. (2008), described in section 4.2, provides an interesting framework to
explain the facts above described. As the authors point out, their model is useful to
explain the dynamics of the informal employment in many Latin American countries where
it appears that the informal sector is an unregulated labour market in which low ability
workers decide to work mainly with the status of self-employed. A similar view is adopted
by Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) in section 4.1. Micro-level data for Italy show that shadow
jobs are ¯lled mainly by unskilled and lower educated workers (see SF 7). Cross-county
9and regional data for Brazil and Italy (i.e. two countries with a large informal economy)
provide evidence of
² a positive correlation between unemployment and shadow employment (SF 8)
An attempt to explain the possibility that Governments hide high level of unemployment
with the presence of a large informal sector is provided in the theoretical section of their
paper.
Given that the search matching literature is mainly based on the idea that workers are
free to choose between formal and informal sector, the empirical question related to the
segmented or voluntary choice view of informality requires further investigation. Bosch and
Maloney (2006) provide evidence that the performance of labour markets is asymmetric
during business cycles. In particular, it supports the voluntary decision during expansion
while it is in favor of segmentation during recessions.10 As pointed out in Perry et al.
(2007), voluntary entry may not rule out some degree of market segmentation. While
individuals are free to choose between the two sectors, the introduction of various labour
market regulations make informal jobs less attractive or decrease the number of formal
vacancies. In this sense, the search-matching literature reviewed in section 4 is able to
take this sort of °exibility into account. See Satchi and Temple (2009) and Zenou (2008),
reviewed in this survey, for a modelling strategy with search frictions focusing on the
dualistic nature of informality.
Evidence on Latin America in favor of the existence of a wage premium for formal
workers is ambiguous and depends on the category of informal job (i.e.self-employed are
in general better paid than salaried workers). Di®erent views are reported in the NCEUS
report. In India the bulk of organized sector employment is paid employment (casual
and regular/salaried), while the bulk of the unorganise sector is self-employment and poor
quality casual workers. The report ¯nds that while there seems to be no apparent di®erent
in wages for casual workers, regular workers in the informal sector are paid considerably
less than their informal counterparts. Similar ¯ndings are reported in Badaoui et al.
(2006) following an econometric studies using the South African Labor Force Survey, but
Perry et al. (2007) note that this traditional comparison of wages between sectors and
10See Perry et al. (2007) for further details on stylized facts concerning the voluntary or segmented view
of informality.
10the existence of a wage premium is not a proof of the existence of segmentation between
formal and informal labour markets.
Further support of the segmented view can be found in Martin (2000) who shows that
in Mexico
² the unemployment rate in the 1990's was low (3.7 per cent) and composed mainly
by well-educated (SF 9).11
This evidence has been formalized by Satchi and Temple (2009) in a search matching
model where workers who do not ¯nd a job are unlikely to have any other choice than to
turn to the informal sector.12
Furthermore, Wahba and Zenou (2005) show that
² in Egypt, 70 per cent of workers obtain a formal job through formal methods (SF
10)
This fact is examined further in Zenou (2008) and in a general equilibrium framework by
Batini et al. (2009).
Ihrig and Moe (2004) reviewed in section 6.1 attempt to explain the following stylized
facts:
² a negative and convex relationship between informal employment and country's stan-
dard of living (SF 11)
² a positive relationship between informal employment and tax rate (SF 12)
Refer to Figures 1 and 2 in Ihrig and Moe (2004).
Finally, as far as the link between informality and (gender) inequality is concerned,
various studies, including Chen (2007) report that informal employment is an important
source of employment for women than for men in LDCs and globally the following stylized
facts emerge:
² a signi¯cant gap in earnings within the informal economy with employers at the top
segment followed by their employees (regular salaried) and by casual workers (SF
13)
11In general, many studies show that unemployment rates in developing countries are low compared to
OECD countries. See for instance Bosch and Maloney (2006) and Bosch and Maloney (2007).
12See section 4.2.
11² men are over-represented in the top segment while women are over-represented in the
bottom segment and the share of women/men in the intermediate segments varies
across sectors and countries (SF 14)13
From those facts emerge an informal sector which is mainly voluntary for employees while
salaried and casual workers are often left with no other choice than to accept the job avail-
able for them given their skills and constraints (i.e. women and requirement of °exibility).
We think, more theoretical work is required to address stylized facts 13 and 14.
2.4.2 Informal credit markets
Informality in credit markets is strong in many developing countries like India, Pakistan,
Indonesia, Brazil and many African countries, but also in emerging market countries like
China. Unfortunately, data on the size of informal credit markets is scant. According to
Bell (1990), over 80 percent of all Indian rural households' debt was borrowed from the
informal credit agencies (excluding relatives and friends which cover about 11 percent) in
1951 but it was a mere 24 percent in 1981. At the same time, the proportion of debt owed
to the formal credit institutions has risen dramatically overtime from 61 percent in 1981 to
7 percent in 1951 and thus the share of informal credit markets is about 39 percent. This
follows the creation of the rural cooperatives in the 1950s that is believed to have displaced
the informal moneylenders in India. However, such ¯gures for the informal credit market
have not changed very much in the 1980s. Data from the All-India Debt and Investment
Survey (AIDIS, 2003) shows that for the Indian economy the share of moneylenders is
over 9 percent while the share of non-institutional to total is over 36 percent.
From the above trends, an additional set of stylized facts (SF) emerges:
² economies with less developed credit markets tend to have more segmented credit
markets, and thus, greater informal credit markets (SF 15)
In conjunction with the previous stylized fact, Barth et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2004)
observe that:
² both formal and informal lenders in less developed credit markets have extensive
market power (SF 16)
13See Figure 1 in Chen (2007) for details.
12However, the creation of the rural cooperatives in India does not enhance only the volume
of funds available in credit markets but also increases competition in the formal credit
markets, inducing another stylized fact:
² informal credit is more important the more concentrated are formal credit markets
(SF 17)
Further relevant evidence for China can be found in Cull and Xu (2005), Chen and Degryse
(2008) and Ayyagari et al. (2008).
There are some some mixed trends in the distribution of credit when both formal and
informal credit markets are present:
² the distribution of formal loans to rural households favors wealthy borrowers or
large farms while the majority of informal loans were distributed to poor borrowers
or small farms (SF 18)
Relevant evidence can be found in Siamwalla et al. (1990) for Thailand and in Kochar
(1997) and Banerjee and Du°o (2007) for India;
² a high proportion of all borrowers obtain credit from both formal and informal credit
markets simultaneously (SF 19).
See Das-Gupta et al. (1989) for India, Conning (2001) for Chile and Gine (2007) for
Thailand; and
² informal moneylenders obtain formal credit to fund their informal credit services
(SF 20)
See Ho® and Stiglitz (1990), Ghate et al. (1992), Irfan et al. (1999) and Madestam (2009).
Credit may be rationed in some periods and credit markets are segmented with local
moneylenders, borrowers with no collateral may have to seek informal credit with high
interest rates. Interest rates charged by moneylenders in informal credit markets may
exceed 75% per year (Besley (1994) and Ho® and Stiglitz (1990)).
² informal interest rates are on average much higher than formal rates (SF 21)
Furthermore, Banerjee (2003) shows that
13² interest rates charged by informal moneylenders may range from 0 to 200 per cent
per year in India, Pakistan, and Thailand (SF 22)
The theoretical rationale for multiple informal interest rates will be reviewed in section 5.
3 Informality in the labour market: early contributions
There are di®erent ways of modelling the informal sector adopting a non-Marshallian view
of labour markets.14 Starting from the classical Harris-Todaro framework, early modelling
in this area has been very proli¯c.
The basic analytical set up used by this literature is similar to that used in the literature
on migration (Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970)) and the modelling approach
adopted by the migration with search literature. As pointed out by Zenou (2008), the
earlier analytical framework { where only one side (i.e the worker) is modeled (Fields,
1975) { di®ers from later set ups that have incorporated the Mortensen-Pissarides model
in a migration equilibrium as in Ortega (2000) and Sato (2004).
The early studies by Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) capture informality
by building a model of two geographically distinct markets that are segmented and in which
two di®erent wage equilibria prevail (wage duality), where wages in the formal sector can
turn out to be higher-than-market-clearing wages. See Lall et al. (2006) for a survey on
rural-urban migration. Brueckner and Zenou (1999b) add a land market to the standard
Harris-Todaro framework where wages are exogenously ¯xed. The idea of identifying the
informal labour market with the disadvantaged sector of a market segmented by rigidities
in the formal sector dates back to Lewis (1954) and the idea of in¯nite labour supply.
Similarly, the report of the International Labor O±ce (ILO (1972)) on employment in
Kenya considered the informal sector as a subsistence sector.
More recent work, like Brueckner and Zenou (1999a), take a di®erent approach and
introduces e±ciency wages. Developments in the theory of imperfect information allows
to introduce labour dualism as a result of a ¯rm's response to adverse selection and moral
hazard problems. In general, there are many models that can be used to justify duality
and the presence of a higher wage in the formal sector, but this always requires an ad
14A view where labour market does not clear.
14hoc assumption about some features characterizing the formal rather than the informal
sector.15
Yet another initial way to model informality involves cost-bene¯t analysis. Within this
approach, the informal sector is seen as an unregulated, largely voluntary, sector (Lucas
(1978) and Rauch (1991)), where agents ponder the costs of becoming formal against the
bene¯ts of being informal.
In section 4 we will review recent advances in modelling informality in the presence of
labour frictions, namely the search-matching theoretical framework and its multi-sectoral
extensions. Relative to the models of the Harris-Todaro tradition, the richer labour market
structure of the search-matching framework determines the wage in the formal sector
endogenously, and allows for a wider range of e®ects to be analyzed. Relative to the
voluntary view of informality, the search-matching approach microfounds the decision of
¯rms and workers to enter the formal/informal sector, while distinguishing among the
three margins of informality by focusing on the °ows between formal and informal labour
market, and unemployment.
4 Informality and labour market frictions
Building on the earlier literature, a variety of more sophisticated models have been devel-
oped to portray formal, informal and integrated labour markets. In these models, trading
frictions in the formal and/or informal sectors are important and it is possible to deter-
mine rules governing the °ows between the two sectors, as well to and from the pool of
unemployed.
For most of these second generation models, the workhorse model involves incorpo-
rating the search matching model of Mortensen-Pissarides in Harris and Todaro (1970)'s
model. In this case the question of how informal-formal jobs are created is not very di®er-
ent from the distinction between the creation/destruction of rural and urban jobs and the
approach is in line with the standard equilibrium model of the labour market with market
frictions and occupational/participation choice. See McKenna (1987) and Garibaldi and
Wasmer (2001).
15The \old search" literature with migration (Fields, 1975) can also be considered an early attempt to
explain and model the existence of an informal sector.
15Other models emphasize the voluntary aspects of informal behavior by by focusing
on the worker's decision to be in the formal or in the informal sector Albrecht et al.
(2008). Similarly, a number of papers focus on the ¯rm's decision to open a formal or an
informal vacancy. Finally, Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) and Frankel and Pissarides (2006)
endogenize, both workers' and ¯rms' decision to join either the formal or informal sector.
Table 4 summarizes the main characteristics of this literature. Below we review in more
detail the three types of models that dominate the search matching-model-based literature
on informal labour markets.
4.1 The intersectoral margin for workers and ¯rms
Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) solve a deterministic search-matching model with heteroge-
neous workers and ¯nd that workers with di®erent skill sort themselves between the two
sectors. The intuition is the following: because informal employment (shadow employment
in the paper) is associated with more labour turnover, it discourages high-skill workers.
The driving assumption is that unemployment bene¯ts are small enough, but a similar
sorting can apply to a framework where the informal economy is characterized by lower
capital intensity and no training commitment. The authors choose a framework with two
labour markets with frictions and two matching functions. Then the marginal worker is
indi®erent between being unemployed in the formal or in the informal sector. Also Fugazza
and Jacques (2003) assume that there are important search frictions in both the formal
and the informal sector since working informally requires \special connections and the
access to the network is time consuming". The model solves for two arbitrage condition,
one for the ¯rms and one for the workers. More than one equilibrium can arise depending
on a parameter which summarizes the relative pro¯tability of the regular and the irregu-
lar sectors. The analytical and numerical exercises of the paper reveal interesting policy
analysis which will be discussed in the following sections. Badaoui et al. (2006) adopt a
Burdett and Mortensen search framework (Burdett and Mortensen (1998)) in which large
¯rms pay a higher wage than small ¯rms and concentrate in the formal sector. Small
¯rms, instead, tend to choose the informal sector. The key factor in the informality choice
is that small ¯rms are less likely to receive a tax inspection respect to large ¯rms. In
presence of search frictions, a wage premium in the formal sector arise since large ¯rms
16are more likely to pay a higher wage. The duality between formal and informal sector is
explained by ¯rm size without the need of introducing any sort of heterogeneity among
workers.
4.2 The intersectoral margin for workers
A sorting similar to Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) is described in Albrecht et al. (2008). The
paper analyzes worker's decision to enter the formal or the informal sector using a search-
matching model with endogenous job destruction. Workers have the same productivity in
the informal sector (self-employment) while they have di®erent productivity if they decide
to enter the formal sector. In this way the relative productivity in the two sectors is an
important factors in the workers' choice. Workers with high productivity levels accept only
formal job o®ers. There are only formal sector ¯rms and they do not know in advance
what type of worker they will meet. In this framework, workers trade-o® their abilities in
the formal sector with a higher job creation in the informal sector.
Also Zenou (2008) assumes that homogeneous workers in the formal sector are more
productive than workers working informally. This di®erence in productivity is justi¯ed
in terms of better technology, access to infrastructure etc. The paper shows that the
informality is a result of market frictions in the formal sector. The author notes that
without market frictions all workers would enter and ¯nd work in the formal sector. As
Albrecht et al. (2008), Zenou (2008) distinguishes between three labour markets: the
formal sector, the informal sector and `formal' unemployment. In Zenou's the informal
sector is competitive and the marginal worker trade-o® the higher productivity of the
formal sector with the friction-less competitive market where all workers ¯nd a job. This
framework largely simpli¯es the analysis and allows for analytical solution and interesting
policy analysis. It also implies that worker's decision to work formally or informally is
based on an endogenous outside option as the marginal productivity of informal labour
decreases when the labour supply in that sector increases.
Are there more coordination failures in the formal ¯rms than in the informal one or
does the informal sector need special connections which are more time consuming? Zenou
assumes at the limit that there are no frictions at all in the informal sector and this
is justi¯ed by the fact that informal workers are mainly self-employed or they work for
17relatives and friends while formal jobs require formal application processes (see SF 10).
Within the informal network, world-of-mouth communication is important and there is
no need of a formal search process. This is in contrast with Fugazza and Jacques (2003).
Satchi and Temple (2009) introduces a search-matching framework in a model of the
Harris and Todaro (1970) tradition. The authors allow for an urban sector with formal
and informal jobs and an agricultural competitive sector. As in Zenou (2008), this allows
for an endogenous outside option for workers which trade-o® the higher productivity of
the urban sector with the security of a job in the agricultural sector. The main downside
of their theoretical framework is that it does not distinguishes unemployed from informal
workers and the informal sectors is seen as \marginal forms of self-employment, made
possible by low entry costs". Workers that cannot ¯nd a job formally because of search-
frictions simply turn to the informal sector. The authors introduces endogenous capital
in the formal sector of a small open economy and recognizes the importance of a general
equilibrium analysis. Finally, Kolm and Larsen (2003) model worker's choice to enter the
formal sector in a search-matching model where agents with di®erent abilities have the
option to acquire education. This theoretical analysis allows for the interactions and the
endogenous determination of unemployment, informality and educational levels.
4.3 The intra¯rm margin and the occupational choice
Bosch (2006) explains the rationale for the existence of both formal and informal con-
tracts within the same ¯rm by modelling the within ¯rm decision of employing informal
labour. Bosch (2007) generalizes the intra ¯rm margin of informality of Bosch (2006) in
a framework with occupational choice. In particular, the author assumes that hetero-
geneous individuals sort themselves between workers, informal self-employed and formal
entrepreneurs. The latter are then able to exploit the intra-¯rm margins of informality by
employing, both, formal and informal labour. An increase in labour market regulations
can expand informality through the intra-¯rm contract decision and also by expanding
the informal self-employment. Bosch (2006 and 2007) models the intra¯rm margin by
extending the basic search-matching model and allowing for ex-post match heterogeneity.
Formally, the choice of a stochastic job matching framework allows for optimal hiring
decision of the ¯rm in function of the productivity of the match between ¯rms and ex-
18ante homogeneous workers. Only matches with high productivity will result in formal
contracts.
5 Informal credit markets
In this section we review the di®erent ways in which the literature has dealt with modelling
informality in credit markets instead of labour markets, in a partial equilibrium context.
Models with a frictionless labour market mainly analyze informality in terms of other
kind of imperfections. The participation to the informal economy usually implies a cost
in terms of limited access to a public good or to formal credit markets. A large informal
credit market also could have an impact on the e±cacy of monetary policy, but so far
theoretical work is very limited (or missing) in this area.
As reviewed in section 2, informal moneylenders on average charge much higher interest
rates than formal interest rates due to segmented credit markets while informal interest
rates range from 0 to 200 percent par year. Relatively low interest rates in informal credit
markets (say, less than 75 per cent per year that would be on average) can be justi¯ed
by friends and family lending or multiple lending from both formal and informal ¯nancial
markets. See (Madestam (2009)). As explained in Ho® and Stiglitz (1990), (rural) informal
credit markets do not work neither as classical competitive markets, nor as markets where
the local moneylender has a monopoly power. The explanation of the higher interest rate
charged has normally been attributed to a lack of information. Adverse selection, moral
hazard and also imperfect enforcement require costly mechanisms such as the design of
contracts, screening process, etc. Also banks rely heavily on collateral and, by de¯nition,
informal ¯rms lacking of collateral, are left with one only option: borrow in the informal
credit sector. This is the case of Thailand, India and the majority of developing countries.
Ghosh et al. (1999) refers to three strands of the literature in the area of informal
credit markets: adverse selection, moral hazard and imperfect contract enforcement. In-
deed, informal credit markets have often been associated with the existence of imperfect
information in ¯nancial markets and limited enforceability. Imperfect information can
generate adverse selection, moral hazard and search externalities.
Below we look at key papers in each strand of the literature and identify some charac-
teristic modelling strategies. A common feature is that, due to a general lack of collateral,
19entrepreneurs in the developing world are credit-constrained and a signi¯cant fraction
of credit is still in the hands of operators in the informal credit market despite the de-
velopment of a formal credit system. Ghosh et al. (1999) review the di®erent modelling
strategies in the partial equilibrium analysis of informal credit markets. The authors point
to informal credit markets and moral hazard and limited enforceability by distinguishing:
models with involuntary and with voluntary default. The main result highlighted in the
survey is that despite the di®erent modelling details, the models share a common view:
credit rationing appears as a rational response to information and enforceability prob-
lems and the small ¯rms with minimum or none collateral seem the more exposed. In
terms of policy recommendations, the authors call for measures aimed at improving the
institutional environment such as improving borrowers' bargaining power,decrease in as-
set inequality etc. instead of macroeconomic policy aimed at increasing the interest rate.
From a di®erent perspective, Yunus and Weber (2007) contribute to the debate on the
impact of microcredit on the standard of life of the very poor. The author adopts a revo-
lutionary approach and look at the positive impact of informal credit on the development
and standard of life in the developing world. Microcredit, following Yunus's de¯nition tar-
gets the very poor, particularly women, and it is based on trust since the lack of collateral
is one of the main limitations of borrowing from standard ¯nancial institutions.
As far as theoretical work on credit-constrained entrepreneurs and informal credit
market is concerned, ¯rstly, we look into papers that focus on adverse selection and moral
hazard. The literature in this area clearly assumes missing markets to explain the emer-
gence of an informal credit market. Secondly, we investigate theoretical modelling with
credit constraints due to search externalities. This strand of literature only mention, with-
out explicitly models, informal credit markets. Thirdly, we review papers that model the
decision to be formal or informal by assuming the lack of access to formal ¯nance as one
of the main cost of going informal. Finally, we move onto papers that investigate the
relationship between informal credit markets and monetary policy.
205.1 Informal credit market, asymmetric information and formal-informal
linkages
The literature on informal credit markets explains informality in the ¯nancial sector as
a cause of pre and/or post-contractual imperfect information which generates problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard. According to this literature, credit-constrained
individuals with limited access to formal banks try to borrow money informally.
5.1.1 Horizontal linkages
Within this framework, formal banks compete directly with informal moneylenders. In-
dividuals can access credit in a two tier process by ¯rst approaching formal banks with
excess liquidity, and then, as this is no longer available, move onto informal moneylenders
to borrow residual funds. Bell (1990) examines the impact on the rural credit market in
India of the introduction of a system of rural cooperatives in the 1950s. Indian data shows
that the creation of the rural cooperatives displaces the informal moneylenders. In an
analytical framework, Bell (1990) shows that such a trend arises because the monopolistic
market power of the rural moneylenders is curbed by the increased competition from the
formal credit institutions such as cooperatives, banks, and government.
Kochar (1997) investigates credit rationing constraints in rural credit markets in India
and particularly, separates the demand for credit from the lenders's decision on access.
Kochar recognizes the fact that the provision of formal credit to rural farmers at a relatively
low interest rate in an attempt to expand agricultural investment may lead to an excess
demand for formal credit, and thus tougher formal credit rationing constraints. It is such
rationing constraints that impart a dual nature to the rural credit market: the formal
regulated sector and the informal sector. Both Bell (1990) and Kochar (1997) argue that
the rationing constraints such that lenders have to charge a high rate for risky households
due to the high screening and monitoring costs would limit the role of formal credit in
enhancing rural investment and reduces the demand for credit.
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) investigate the theoretical underpinnings of insurance mar-
kets characterized by moral hazard, and show how moral hazard can have a mixed impact
on non-market insurance institutions. Households and ¯rms borrow from friends, family
and neighbors when hit by an adverse shock, and pay back later when things get better, as
21reported by Aryeetey et al. (1997). Such informal mutual assistance between non-market
institutions is unobservable to market insurers and its impact appears to be either neg-
ative or positive, depending on the market structure. From their model, it is predicted
that, when formal and informal insurers have the same information, the informal insurance
crowds out formal insurance leading to welfare-inferior outcomes. In contrast, when infor-
mal insurers have a better position in peer monitoring, the existence of informal insurance
is welfare-enhancing. (See, among others, Stiglitz (1990) and Banerjee et al. (1994).)
5.1.2 Vertical linkages
Informal lenders have access to formal banks and so can use funds generated formally for
lending in informal markets. Ho® and Stiglitz (1997), Floro and Ray (1997), Bose (1998)
and Madestam (2009), among others, discuss this vertical interaction between formal and
informal credit sectors. Most of these studies report the adverse e®ect of government
policies of providing low-cost or subsidized credit to the agricultural sector through the
formal credit institutions such as cooperatives and banks. Ho® and Stiglitz (1997) de-
velop models to show that with endogenous enforcement costs, government-subsidized
formal credit may not be able to enhance agricultural investment. Subsidies may attract
more moneylenders to enter the informal credit market leading to higher interest rates
through three channels. A rise in new entry may raise the marginal transaction costs (via
economies of scale), increase the marginal enforcement cost of moneylenders due to re-
duced borrowers'incentives to repay (via enforcement externalities), and reduce the °ows
of information about each borrowers' credit history and thus weaken \reputation e®ects"
that punish defaulters. Through these three e®ects, subsidized funds may eventually raise
interest rates and reduce the availability of loans in the informal sector. Bose (1998) ar-
gues that although the informal moneylenders as a whole have some relative advantage
in collecting, screening, and monitoring the information about borrowers' credit history
and investment behavior, they may also face the problem with the asymmetric informa-
tion about the borrower-speci¯c degree of risk. Such heterogeneity in moneylenders and
borrowers brings about adverse composition e®ects and, in turn, increase interest rates
charged by moneylenders as in Kochar (1997). Floro and Ray (1997) reach a similar con-
clusion but with di®erent reasoning. Considering the special case of Philippines, they ¯nd
22that an expansion of credit available to informal lenders through the formal sector might
trigger aggressive lending (like a credit war). In a repeated game framework, moneylenders
might then decide to collude among themselves leading to higher interest rates.
The ¯ndings in Madestam (2009) are in line with the above studies using a model that
like those assumes formal and informal credit sectors, but that in addition assumes that
informal moneylenders are heterogeneous. Two types of lenders exist in the informal credit
market: rich informal lenders who do not to borrow formally to lend informally, and poorer
informal lenders who must access banks to fund their business. The model rationalizes
the coexistence of formal and informal credit markets assuming that formal and informal
lenders face di®erent agency and monitoring constraints (for example, informal lenders are
able to closely monitor borrowers who are usually known clients whilst banks have limited
information on moral hazard at the investment stage). The main ¯ndings of the paper is
that the existence of informal ¯nance results in three e®ects. First, informal credit leads to
the \investment e®ect" such that additional informal ¯nance increases the investment of
bank rationed borrowers by channeling bank funds to informal lending. Second, informal
credit generates a \disciplinary e®ect". Since borrowers in informal markets do not need to
pay agency costs that usually arise from bank ¯nance, the borrowers' return to investment
is higher than otherwise and they have less incentives to default, leading to increased bank
lending. Finally, the agency problem leads to the \rent-extraction e®ect". By letting
informal lenders with good credit or collateral channel bank funds to informal borrowers,
banks are able to avoid high agency costs arising from directly lending to poor borrowers (in
addition to the monitoring problem), preventing borrowers from accessing bank ¯nance.
As a result, if the rent-extraction e®ect prevails, borrowers are worse o®. Using this
model, Madestam (2009) also investigates the role of market power in the banking sector,
rea±rming the general ¯nding that the stronger this is the less e±cient the credit market
equilibrium. When the banking sector has higher market power, the rent-extraction e®ect
dominates, and as a corollary informal credit markets are more prevalent .
5.2 Informal credit markets and trading frictions
As discussed, one way to model credit rationing is by introducing imperfect information.
While models with moral hazard and adverse selection in ¯nancial markets have been
23widely discussed in other surveys (see for example Ghosh et al. (1999)), the role of search
externalities in credit markets has only recently been recognized. Within this framework,
market liquidity depends on the matching process between borrowers and lenders. This
literature suggests that search frictions in credit markets are particularly useful in the
modelling of informal labour an product markets where informal ¯rms cannot rely on col-
lateral and need to contact informal moneylenders. Wasmer and Weil (2004) develop a
model with credit and labour market imperfections due to trading frictions in both mar-
kets,16 where labour and capital imperfections are symmetric. Assumptions in this model
depart from the traditional search and matching literature because here entrepreneurs
need to ¯nance the search process and need to ¯nd a lender (i.e. a moneylender in the
informal credit market) to start-up a business activity. Likewise, Becsi et al. (2005) model
credit market activity within a search match framework where borrowers are heteroge-
nous. A few other papers adopt trading frictions in the credit markets (Dell'Ariccia and
Garibaldi (2000) among the others), but to the best of our knowledge, none has explicitly
used trading frictions in the credit market to model the ¯rm's decision to enter or not the
informal sector and trading frictions in the credit market have not yet been incorporated in
a DSGE model. Wasmer and Weil (2004), by introducing ¯nancial imperfections, provide
a simple measure of the ¯nancial accelerator based on the idea of a `credit gap': credit
market frictions reduce the number of entrepreneurs discouraged by the lower probability
of ¯nding a lender, and in turn this creates a negative externality by reducing the number
of lenders, accelarating the adverse implications of a contraction in credit. This way credit
market imperfections magnify the negative consequences of economic shocks. The authors
show that the excess return on business loans, i.e. the \credit gap", depends on the bank's
bargaining power and on the degree of market imperfections.
5.3 Credit-constrained entrepreneurs, informal credit and labour mar-
kets linkages
In the ¯rm's choice between operating formally or informally (i.e. intra¯rm margin),
access to informal credit markets is often represented as one of the costs of going informal.
This is the approach taken by Straub (2005) where access to formal credit markets and
16The model assumes risk-neutral agents and take the interest/discount rate as given.
24key public goods (property rights and contract enforceability) interact with the entry costs
in the formal sector. The model is based on two of the above mentioned costs due to the
lack of information: creation of the right incentives and \Ma¯a-style" enforcement. The
author builds on the investment model with moral hazard by Holmstrom-Tirole (1997)to
show that the choice between formal and informal sectors depends on the registering costs,
the relative e±ciency of credit markets, initial wealth and collateral.
Along these lines, de Paula and Scheinkman (2007) explore what are the implications
of having (or not) access to formal credit markets. The authors model informality in an
occupational choice model where low ability agents work as salaried workers or become
managers in the informal sector while high ability individuals prefer to be managers in
the formal sector. The de¯nition of informality is in terms of tax avoidance (evasion
dualism). In equilibrium, the marginal ¯rm is indi®erent between the obligation of paying
taxes on the one hand and the higher cost of capital together with scale limitations on
the other. In particular, informal ¯rms face a higher cost of capital and a probability
equal to one to be detected if their capital is above a threshold value. Capital here is
a proxy for the size of the ¯rm. Other authors before show that the size of the ¯rm is
an important factor in the distinction between formal and informal ¯rms (Rauch (1991)).
de Paula and Scheinkman (2007) add capital and show that constrained and unconstrained
informal ¯rms have a lower capital-labour ratio than formal ¯rms. They then develop a
model with two production stages and show that the informality of a ¯rm is correlated
to the informality of its upstream and downstream sector. Also based on Rauch (1991),
Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) model the ¯rm's decision to be formal or informal. In
particular, risk-neutral agents decide to be workers or entrepreneurs in function of their
talents. Entrepreneurs then decide to be formal or informal through a cost-bene¯t analysis
in which they weight the possibility to avoid taxes and regulation costs with the imperfect
access to formal credit markets.
5.4 Informal credit markets and monetary policy
The implications for monetary policy of informal behavior in credit markets are contro-
versial. One set of scholars examining this in the context o low income countries, for
example, argues that low interest rate policy would reduce the cost of physical capital and
25thus promote capital accumulation and growth when credit markets are segmented and
lower income households are credit constrained and thus, can only access informal credit
markets. The monetary and ¯scal policy implications for keeping rural interest rates low
is illustrated in Ghatak (2007): Once farmers have higher real income, they will raise their
repayments, reducing the risk premium and thus the interest rate. Measures to raise real
income suggested include low in°ation as well as increasing agricultural output through
rural innovation. In this scenario, in°ation not only reduces farmers' real income but
also moneylenders' real value of repayments, inducing higher interest rates which, in turn,
compensates for non-performing loans.
On the other hand, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) emphasize the importance
that funds remain market-determined and are not rationed as a consequence of interest
rate interventions (e.g. administratively-enforced caps) because this promotes the accu-
mulation of money balances which, in their view, are complements and not substitutes of
physical capital. Financial regulation restraining real interest rates as well as other forms
of selective credit control could reduce savings and investment while perversely enhancing
segmentation of ¯nancial markets. Therefore, these scholars argue that policies of ¯nancial
liberalization that free real interest rates in formal credit markets can increase savings and
capital accumulation (see e.g. Fry (1978)) with bene¯ts for borrowers of all income levels.
One criticisms of this view can be found in Taylor (1983) and van Wijnbergen (1982),
who maintain that if interest payments account for a large proportion of total production
costs, aggressive ¯nancial liberalization ending up in strong increases in borrowing costs
by low income producers could well lower overall output, and divert credit away from in-
formal markets into formal banking sectors, thereby raising further informal interest rates,
and reducing informal borrowing and investment by lower income agents (Thornton and
Poudyal (1990) and Ghatak and Chandio (2009)).
6 General Equilibrium models of informality
Although many recognize the importance of modelling informal behavior within general
equilibrium set ups (e.g.Satchi and Temple (2009), Marjit and Kar (2008) Sinha (2005)
and Zenou (2008)) most general equilibrium search matching models either incorporate
ad hoc representations of informality or assume it away altogether. For example, stan-
26dard assumptions in the search-matching literature (i.e. linear utility function among the
other), exclude the consumption-hours decision which is at the heart of more comprehen-
sive models of informal behavior. In this section we summarize the literature advances
in the general equilibrium environment with informality. First, we look at the way Com-
putable General Equilibrium (CGE) models include an informal sector. Second, we look
at simple dynamic general equilibrium models with wage (and price) °exibility. Third,
we look at the literature that studies the long-term impact of informality adopting an
endogenous growth framework. Finally, we review the analysis of informality embedded
in New Keynesian set ups with price and wage rigidities.
6.1 Informality in Computable General Equilibrium models
Sinha (2005) Sinha and Adam (2000), Gibson and Kelley (1994) and Portes et al. (1989)
analyse the informal sector in a macroeconomic framework using a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) structure. CGE modelling, also referred as AGE (Applied General
Equilibrium) models, use actual data to estimate the impact of mainly technological and
policy changes within a database consisting of input-output table, elasticities, etc. This
kind of modelling strategies were often used for developing countries where time series data
were scarce. Compared with the more recent general equilibrium modelling strategies, the
CGE models are mainly non-stochastic and static (i.e. they model the reactions of the
economy at one point in time). Sinha (2005) provides a `mini' survey on CGE models
including an informal sector and di®erentiates CGE models focusing on informality in
product markets (Gibson and Kelley (1994)) and CGE models based on segmented labour
market theories (e.g.,Portes et al. (1989)) where informality is de¯ned in respect to the
factor markets.
6.2 Informality and Dynamic General Equilibrium models with wage
°exibility
Agenor and Montiel (1996) introduces a series of simple macroeconomic models which
are then used in Marjit and Kar (2008) for various policy experiments with an informal
labour market. The authors model capital mobility between formal and informal sectors
with the purpose to analyze the impact of deregulation on informal wages. The intuition
27is the following: in developing countries people cannot a®ord to be unemployed so if they
do not ¯nd a job they work in the informal sector (i.e. unemployed as informal workers
as in Saatchi and Temple). Satchi and Temple (2009) develop this idea in a search-
matching model and for this reason the paper is discussed in section 4. \It may be argued
that the problem of the very poor and the unskilled was never lack of jobs, but the wage
rate". According to this, it is the wage rate and not the employment status a criterion
to measure the standard of living in the developing world (Marjit and Kar, 2008). Ihrig
and Moe (2004) develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with 2 sectors: a formal
sector where ¯rms employ labour and capital and an informal sector with ¯rms employing
only labour (i.e. there is a ¯xed stock of capital). The economic agents decide between
consumption and savings and the time allocated to the two sectors. As capital increases in
the formal sector labour moves from the informal to the formal sector until the marginal
productivities of labour in the two sectors are equalized. The main trade-o® is between
paying taxes to the government or access to formal capital markets.
Conesa et al. (2002) present a similar model, but introduce a stochastic element. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the ¯rst DSGE model that incorporates an informal
sector. The authors introduce a second sector into a standard Real Business Cycle (RBC)
model which is described as an \underground" economy that has a di®erent technology,
produces goods and services that could otherwise be produced in the formal sector, but
is not registered in NI accounts. As pointed out by the authors, ...\The tradability of the
output generated by this activities is the key features distinguishing our approach from the
household production literature. The main characteristics of the model include: a wage
premium which can be seen as the opportunity cost of not working in the o±cial sector
and labour indivisibilities in the formal/registered sector. Households choose a probability
of working in the informal sector which can be interpreted as the purchase of lotteries in a
perfectly insured market. When a worker chooses the informal sector he/she enjoy more
leisure at the price of a smaller wage, while in the formal sector individuals work more,
but receive a wage premium. In particular, the authors assume labour to be indivisible in
the formal/registered sector with hours worked ¯xed exogenously.
The main prediction of the model is that wage premium di®erentials can explain the
di®erent size of macroeconomic °uctuations as a function of technological shocks. The
28intuition is the following: countries with a smaller wage premium have a lower opportunity
cost to participate in the formal sector and so they have smaller participation rates. In
those countries, the e®ects of technological shocks are ampli¯ed.
Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) in a dynamic model with a household sector show how
the Friedman rule of zero in°ation is not optimal in countries with a large informal sector
(labour, good or ¯nancial markets). In their model, individuals allocate time between
consumption and labour in the formal or informal sector. The main idea is that if gov-
ernment's ability to tax in the labour and commodity markets is limited, an in°ation tax
decreases those distorsions. The e±cacy of monetary policy in a framework where part
of the economy is not observable (i.e the informal sector) is analyzed within a DSGE
framework in Batini et al. (2009) and will be discussed in section 6.3.
In section 2 we show evidence in support of the idea that self-employed and informal
workers are mainly concentrated in non tradables (Brazil 92%, Colombia 87% and Mexico
83%). Fiess et al. (2006) and Loyaza and Rigolini (2006) develop two macroeconomic
models to investigate the nature of the informal sector. The former looks at the behavior
of the informal sector during a business cycle as a reaction to temporary and permanent
macroeconomic shocks. The latter studies the evolution of the steady-state and the cyclical
behavior of the informal sector (i.e. the long-run trends and cycles as the title suggests)
by modelling the intersectoral margins for the ¯rm.
Fiess et al. (2006) model a formal (salaried tradable) sector and an informal (self-
employment non-tradable) sector in a Rogo®-Obstfeld small economy with the aim to
capture the sector origin of the shock through variation in the real exchange rate. What
are the drivers of large wage movements? A part from the origin of the shock, wage rigidi-
ties can explain the cyclical behavior of the informal sector. As discussed in section 2, the
informal sector does not seem to simply behave in a way to absorb shocks during nega-
tive shocks and recessions. The informal sector in the paper is characterized, a part from
self-employment, by credit constraints and a di®erent technology. All workers are homo-
geneous when salaried workers, while they produce in proportion to their entrepreneurial
capability when informal self-employed. The model includes an occupational choice where
the marginal individual is indi®erent between salaried work and self-employment. Finally,
the authors introduce potential wage rigidities in the formal salaried sector. The com-
29movement of relative sector sizes are analyzed and the authors show how there is evidence
in favor of, both, the segmented and the voluntary view of the informal sector depending
on the origin of the shock and the presence of wage rigidities in the formal labour market.
6.3 Endogenous growth and informality
The growth literature has made much progress in identifying the determinants of economic
growth since mid 1980s and recently started explaining why growth rates vary across
countries. As discussed in a special lecture by Hsieh (2009), potential determinants of such
variation include misallocation of inputs across ¯rms and industries as well as informality
and, nevertheless, the growth literature has paid little attention to the relationship between
growth and informality.
A few endogenous growth models with the presence of the informal sector are reviewed
here, such as Loayza (1997), Sarte (1997) and Dasgupta (2005). As in the present survey,
Loayza (1997) discusses the rationality of being informal in the light of the costs and
bene¯ts of legality of businesses and recognizes the importance of government-provided
goods and services as they are part of costs of informality and congested by informal
production. Loayza (1997) develops an AK-type endogenous model that exhibits constant
returns to capital Rebelo (1991) in which the assumption of Barro and Sala-i Martin
(1992) is incorporated that the relative amount of public services to aggregate production
available to individual agents determines the capital rate of returns. In this framework,
agents in the formal sector pay a proportional fraction of income as taxes while agents in
the informal sector pay a proportional fraction of income as penalties for being illegal and
thus they have a limited access to available public services. Agents are assumed to freely
move across sectors. Public services are assumed to be ¯nanced by taxes on production of
the formal sector and to be positively a®ected by the quality of government institutions.
To re°ect congestible public services, the relative size of the informal sector is devised
to reduce capital productive for all agents in the economy. Within this framework, the
equilibrium is to be set where formal and informal rates of returns equate. The model
predicts that the relative size of the informal sector has a negative impact on economic
growth particularly in economies with high tax burden and week enforcement systems that
in general increase the size of the informal sector.
30Another study that follows similar arguments in an endogenous growth framework is
Sarte (1997) that examines the e®ect of rent-seeking behaviors of bureaucrats on economic
growth. Sarte (1997) develops a growth model based on Romer (1990) by incorporating
both the presence of congestion in enforcing property rights and the bureaucratic rent-
seeking behaviors in regulation and taxation that limit entry into the formal sector. From
this model, it was found that such rent-seeking bureaucracies force marginal ¯rms to
move into the informal sector even if they would face high costs of informality, leading
to lower growth of the entire economy. In the case of the low cost of informality, on
the other hand, entry conditions do not bind and a large number of ¯rms would operate
in the informal sector. However, as criticised by Nikopour et al. (2008) who conclude
in favour of the positive relationship, it is not surprising to have a negative association
between informality and economic growth because the two growth models reviewed above
have been built on the strong assumption that the production technology is basically
determined by congestible tax-¯nanced public services.
Dasgupta (2005) recently develops an endogenous growth model with informal credit
markets and shows a positive e®ect of informality on growth. Unlike previous studies,
Dasgupta (2005) employs a dynamic general equilibrium framework in order to resolve the
endogeneity issue between ¯nancial development and growth. Similar to those assumptions
on ¯nancial markets discussed in the previous section, it is assumed that households can
borrow formally and informally and ¯rms are heterogeneous with di®erent degree of risk
on which banks have asymmetric information. Households are also assumed to invest in
human capital with ¯nancial costs rather than time costs. Within the framework with the
credit rationing regime that developing countries mostly take, it is shown that informal
¯nancial markets separate the high risk ¯rms from the low risk ones and thus reduce
the cost of credit rationing and increase the growth rates. Even higher growth rates are
expected when economies take the self revelation regime in which banks formulate an
incentive mechanism based on each ¯rm's self-selected demand and set various lending
rates.
316.4 New Keynesian models with informal labour markets
A series of papers incorporate the search and matching approach into DSGE models to
explain the cyclical behavior of employment, job creation and job destruction in response
to a monetary policy shock as well as the impact on the in°ation rate. See Yasgiv (2007)
for a survey on the developments of search-matching models and (Ravenna and Walsh
(2007)) for a recent application of search frictions in New Keynesiam models. In general
there is a rapidly growing literature on search matching labour market in New Keynesian
DSGE models in addition to Ravenna and Walsh (2007). Christiano et al. (2007) and
Thomas (2008) introduce labour market frictions in New Keynesian models allowing the
study of, both, the intensive and the extensive margin of labour usage during the business
cycle. Blanchard and Gali (2007) adopt a simpler hiring cost approach in a New Keynesian
framework.
Castillo and Montoro (2008) develop Blanchard and Gali (2007) by modelling a dual
labour market economy with formal and informal labour contracts within a New Keynesian
model with labour market frictions. This is the ¯rst paper that analyzes together the
creation of informal jobs and the interaction between the informal sector and monetary
policy. Informality is a result of hiring costs, which are a function of the ratio of vacancies
to unemployment (labour market tightness). In equilibrium, ¯rms in the wholesale sectors
balance the higher productivity of a formal production process with the lower hiring costs
of the informal process. Marginal costs will then become a function also of the proportion
of informal jobs in the economy. The interesting results of this theoretical framework is
that during period of high aggregate demand the informal sector expands due to lower
hiring costs associated with this technology. This creates a link between informality, the
dynamics of in°ation and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In particular,
the authors show that \informal workers act as a bu®er stock of labour that allows ¯rms
to expand output without putting pressure on wages".
Batini et al. (2009) adopt a similar approach by modelling the presence of an `unob-
servable' classical labour market together with a wage norm to summarize frictions in the
formal sector. This allows a general equilibrium analysis which is more in the Harris and
Todaro tradition (Harris and Todaro, 1970) and the study of the link between in°ation and
unemployment. The authors conclude that the bene¯ts from reducing the informal sector
32{ i.e. tax smoothing and net bene¯ts from stabilization with tax smoothing { outweigh
the cost in terms of less wage °exibility.
7 Conclusions
Since the initial studies on informality (ILO, 1972) and the in°uential work of De Soto
(1989), empirical and theoretical ¯ndings on the informal economy have been extensive
and often contrasting. Furthermore, the concept of informality has changed over time.
Chen (2007) describes the move from the `old' view of an informal sector to a more
comprehensive concept of the informal economy (i.e. from the characteristics of the ¯rm
to the characteristics of the employment relationship). 17 Open questions on the de¯nition,
methods of estimation, causes and e®ects of the informal economy point to the need for
more work in the area.
We have reviewed two main approaches. A strand of the informality literature focuses
on the theoretical issues of informality in the credit market. Another strand of theoretical
research investigates informality in the labour market. The two modelling approaches
address many of the stylized fact describes in section 2.4 (SF3, SF4, SF5, SF6, SF7 and
SF8 for the informal employment and SF15, SF18, SF19, SF20, SF21 and SF22 for the
informal credit markets), while others require further development (SF1, SF2, SF13, and
SF14 for the informal employment and SF 16 and SF17 for the informal credit markets).
Clearly, the two views share many theoretical and policy issues. In general, we are left
with few key questions. How e®ective are government policies in countries with a large
informal (and often) unobservable labour/credit markets? What are the links between
informality and (endogenous) growth? Can informality be good in some respects? What
is the link between informality and gender inequality? Our assessment of the literature is
that most of the existing models, though relevant, share a partial equilibrium approach
to informality. A closer scrutiny of the phenomenon able to capture various aspects of
informality (i.e. multi-informality in the product, labour and credit markets) requires a
dynamic general equilibrium approach in which households' and producers' choices over
time are explicitly taken into account.
17See ILO (1972), ILO (2002) and Table 2 for details.
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43Table 1: Informality
View Dualism Markets Processes/Goods/Services Linkages
Productive scale product legal Dualist
legalistic wage labour illegal structuralist
evasion credit legalistic
Table 2: Views for the informal economy from Table 1 in Chen (2007)
The old view: ILO 1972 The new view: ILO 2002
traditional economy that will disappear here to stay and expand
only marginally productive contributes signi¯cantly to GDP
separate from formal economy linked with formal economy
represents a reserve pool of surplus labour inf. due to less formal jobs or informalization
street traders and small-scale producers wide range of informal occupations
entrepreneurs who avoid taxes/regulations wage workers, entrepreneurs and self-empl.
44Table 3: Informal economy as a percentage of GDP
Unweighted Average*
1989-1991 1994/1995 1999-2000
24 African countries 33.9 37.4 41.2
25 Asian countries 20.9 23.4 26.3
17 countries Cent. and South America 34.2 37.7 41.5
23 Transitional countries 31.5 34.6 37.9
21 OECD countries 13.2 15.7 16.7







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































46Table 5: Towards a general equilibrium approach to informality
Papers Informality Partial DGE DSGE
RBC NK
Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) Labor X
Bosch (2006,2007) Labor X
Frankel and Pissarides (2006) Labor X
Albrecht et al. (2008) Labor X
Zenou (2008) Labor X
Satchi and Temple (2009) Labor X
Fiess et al. (2006) Labor X
Conesa et al. (2002) Labor X
Fugazza and Jacques (2003) Labor X
Ihrig and Moe (2004) Product X
Castillo and Montoro (2008) Labor X
Marjit and Kar (2008) Labor X
Solomon (2008) Labor X
Batini et al. (2009) Labor X
Wasmer and Weil (2004) Labor+Credit X
de Paula and Scheinkman (2007) Labor+Credit X
Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) Labor+Credit X
Bell (1990) Credit X
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) Credit X
Banerjee et al. (1994) Credit X
Floro and Ray (1997) Credit X
Ho® and Stiglitz (1997) Credit X
Kochar (1997) Credit X
Bose (1998) Credit X
Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2000) Credit X
Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) Credit X
Madestam (2009) Credit X
Dasgupta (2005) Credit X
Loayza (1997) Product X
Sarte (1997) Product X
47